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WARNING THE ACCUSED OF HIS RIGHT TO APPOINTED
COUNSEL: THE RIDDLE OF FOOTNOTE FORTY-THREE
The Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois' and Miranda v. Ari-
zona2 was concerned with the admissibility of statements obtained from
individuals subjected to custodial police interrogation. Procedures
were sought to assure that the individual's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and sixth amendment right to counsel were
not abridged.3 The Supreme Court recognized a need to eliminate the
coercive element inherent in police interrogations. This coercion was
often expressed through police brutality,4 but it has been recognized
that coercion may involve more subtle, mental pressures.' If the law
enforcement authorities can isolate the accused individual and deny
him outside support, they can so undermine his will that he loses all
sense of judgment and speaks when he would ordinarily remain silent.'
To protect against this subtle coercion, the Supreme Court held in
Miranda that prior to any questioning the law enforcement authorities
must warn the accused individual that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says may be used against him, that he has the right to
have an attorney present at the interrogation, and if he is unable to af-
ford an attorney, one will be provided for him.' If interrogation fol-
lows and the defendant proceeds without aid of counsel, there is a
heavy burden on the state to show that the defendant made an intelli-
gent and knowledgeable waiver of his rights.'
In footnote forty-three of Miranda, the Supreme Court states:
While a warning that the indigent may have counsel appointed need
not be given to the person who is known to have an attorney or is
1. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 439. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was
applied to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and the sixth amendment
right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 nn. 6 & 7 (1966), for a list of
examples of physical brutality.
5. Blackbur v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940).
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
7. Id. at 478.
8. Id. at 475.
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known to have ample funds to secure one, the expedient of giving a warn-
ing is too simple and the rights too important to engage in ex post
facto inquiries into financial ability when there is any doubt at all
on that score.2
The footnote gives rise to several questions. Should courts decide the
adequacy of the appointed counsel warning on the basis of police
knowledge of the accused's financial status at the time of arrest and
interrogation or on the basis of an ex post facto hearing into financial
status at some later time? If a court accepts the latter means of deter-
nuination, what is the temporal focal point for the determination of
indigence? Under both tests a court must develop a practical defini-
tion of indigence. A third alternative would be to ignore financial
status completely and require the law enforcement authorities to give
all warnings in all cases. Additionally, the application of the "harmless
constitutional error" rule arises in footnote forty-three situations. This
note examines each of these questions.10
I. POLICE KNOWLEDGE TEST
One possible solution to footnote forty-three cases is to base the nec-
essity of giving the warning on police knowledge of the accused's fi-
nancial status at the time of the interrogation. The footnote language
makes that interpretation plausible. The Court speaks of what is
"known" about the accused. Assuming the police know that a partic-
ular defendant has ample funds to retain counsel and fail to warn him
of the right to appointed counsel, reliance on such knowledge in these
situations does not appear to violate the defendant's rights. No court
9. Id. at 473.
10. There is also the problem of burden of proof of indigence. Several states
have refused to admit confessions into evidence for failure to give the appointed coun-
sel warning on grounds that the state failed to meet its burden of proof that the de-
fendant was not indigent. Griffith v. Jones, 283 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ga. 1967);
James v. State, 223 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Braun, 98 Ill,
App. 2d 5, 241 N.E.2d 25 (1968); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 740, 160
S.E.2d 793 (1968). Miranda places the burden on the state to show the defendant
has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. This is justified on the
ground that the state creates the isolated circumstances in which the interrogation
takes place, and it is best able to corroborate evidence that the warnings are properly
given. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). If the state is unable to
demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver, the defendant's statement will not be
introduced into evidence. Traditionally, the accused individual who desires appointed
counsel has the burden of showing his indigence. State v. Anaya, 76 N.M. 572, 417
P.2d 58 (1966).
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has formally adopted the police knowledge test in footnote forty-three
situations, but decisions in several jurisdictions suggest that police
knowledge of the defendant's financial status is one way to attack the
footnote forty-three problem.
Should a court adopt a police knowledge test, it would have to de-
fine whether the test is objective or subjective. An objective test would
require the reviewing court to ask the following question: was the
police officer's decision to forego the appointed counsel warning rea-
sonable under the circumstances? If there is sufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that the defendant is non-indigent, then the
decision to forego the warning will be upheld. If such evidence is
lacking the court will have to suppress the defendant's statement. In
no case has this test been used to admit a statement by a defendant
ultimately found to be indigent. What the test does is provide the
non-indigent defendant with an additional protection against careless
police behavior. Not only must the defendant be non-indigent, but the
state must also establish that the police had a factual basis to believe
that the defendant was non-indigent. A subjective police knowledge
test is similar to the objective test but differs in one respect. The police
must have more than a reasonable basis for believing the defendant
to be non-indigent. They must have actual knowledge that the de-
fendant either has an attorney or ample funds to retain one.
There are several instances in which the test would not be of aid
to the defendant. If the accused has retained counsel who is present
at the interrogation and the warning is not given 1 or the accused in-
dividual says he has an attorney, and later employs that attorney, 2 the
possibilities for harm to the defendant are minimized. In other cases
the defendant's physical appearance alone arguably could obviate the
necessity of giving the warning.' 3  However, physical appearance may
11. Nicholi v. State, 451 P.2d 351 (Alas. 1969).
12. Morn v. People, - Colo. -, 481 P.2d 729 (1971). The court stated that
requiring the warning of the right to appointed counsel in this situation would be
"ritualistic and devoid of substance."
13. The cases discussed below do not employ the police knowledge test. There is
no explicit reference to it in any case. They do, however, present situations in which
police knowledge may be sufficient to dispense with giving the appointed counsel
warning. Statements held to be admissible:
In Commonwealth v. Wilbur, 353 Mass. 376, 231 N.E.2d 919 (1967), cert. denied
390 U.S. 1010 (1968), the omission of the right to appointed counsel warning was
held to be immaterial since the defendant was a uniformed natural resource officer
and could exercise all powers of a policeman except the service of civil process.
Vol. 1972:117] 119
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be quite deceiving. Criminal cases in which the defendant seeks the
aid of appointed counsel on account of indigence provide examples in
which the courts have had difficulty determining the defendant's in-
digence. A court will look to complex indicia of financial status in
order to answer this question. The nature of this inquiry will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part III of this note. 
14
One in this position could hardly be ignorant of his rights. Moreover, he was not
indigent. He owned an antique shop and had just sold its contents. The problem which
disturbed the court was the nonretroactivity of Miranda, Johnson v. New Jersey,
384 U.S. 719 (1966). The interrogation was prior to Miranda, but the trial was held
afterwards. There was complete compliance with Escobedo. The court found that the
police could not reasonably anticipate Miranda and the warnings required there "must
be applied reasonably and with common sense and do not constitute an arid, ritualistic
formula to be administered inflexibly," 353 Mass. 376, 383, 231 N.E.2d 919, 923.
With regard to the retroactivity problem, see notes 43 & 44 infra and accompanying
text.
In United States v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
953 (1968), the defendant was indicted for having received items of value from his
employer at a time when he was representing a labor organization. The accused was
then earning $450 per week and had retained counsel throughout the proceeding.
In United States v. Lubitsch, 266 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), a revenue agent
was charged with accepting $200 from a taxpayer in connection with an audit exami-
nation. As an employee of the Internal Revenue Service, the defendant was caming
$9000 per year. There was evidence that he and his wife jointly owned a house
worth $20,000 and had an $1800 bank balance at the time. See also Dickey v. State,
444 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1968). Statements held to be inadmissible:
In Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969), a school teacher
turned himself in to the police. The state argued that the defendant was not indigent.
Since the defendant was a teacher, the state assumed he could afford to pay a lawyer.
The court, however, found that even in this case one could not be so certain as to omit
the warning. This decision was based on the court's earlier holding in Commonwealth
v. Dixon, 432 Pa. 423, 248 A.2d 231 (1968). Although the police did not learn that
the accused had retained counsel in another criminal prosecution until they were four
hours into the interrogation, the court suggests that even had they known of this fact at
the outset, the result would be no different. Just because an individual had retained an
attorney in another case does not mean he is still financially able to employ one or
that he has an attorney for all criminal purposes. With reference to footnote forty-
three the court stated that "this loophole is a narrow one which can only be utilized
in the clearest of cases. Here the Commonwealth's argument is at best a shaky one."
432 Pa. 423, 427, 248 A.2d 231, 233.
In State v. Gendreau, - R.I. -, 259 A.2d 855 (1969), the defendant was twenty-
two years old and discharged from the Navy on account of a personality disorder.
The police only knew the defendant was a carpenter. The court, in holding that the
state did not meet its burden in proving indigence, gave indigence a broad defini-
tion-able to retain an attorney from the interrogation until the end of the entire
proceedings.
14. For an overview of the general difficulty courts have in determining indigence,
see cases cited in notes 35 & 36 infra and accompanying text.
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Any test based on police knowledge must be fairly precise. Several
factors support this conclusion. First, many people accused of serious
crimes are indigent and are entitled to appointed counsel. 5  The police
are aware of this. Secondly, indigence is a complex question, often
difficult to evaluate from the mere physical appearance of the defend-
ant." Thirdly, reliance on police knowledge would arguably tend to
undermine the goals established in Miranda. The Court in Miranda
wanted to ensure that the individual defendant understands his rights
so that he can make an intelligent decision whether he wants to stand
on his right to remain silent or wishes to make a statement. The Court
decided that no defendant could make an intelligent decision if un-
aware of his rights. It follows that the warning should not be con-
veyed in terms which would lead the accused to believe he is only
entitled to a lawyer if he can afford one.'7 By placing the additional
requirement of knowledge on law enforcement authorities, the courts
could prevent haphazard administration of the Miranda warnings. Still
unanswered is the question of what constitutes adequate knowledge of
the defendant's financial status.
A few cases suggest the degree of care the police must exercise in
ascertaining the defendant's financial status before a court will excuse
the omission of the appointed counsel warning. In Commonwealth v.
Dixon,'8 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania limited police discretion
in omitting the appointed counsel warning. It did not hold that the
15. Birzon, Kasarof & Forma, The Right to Counsel and the Indigent Accused in
Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction in New York State, 14 BUFF. L. REv. 428, 433 (1965)
(65-90% of all felony defendants brought into the New York courts are indigent);
H. Pollack, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Mnm. L. REv. 737, 738 (1961) (more than
1,000,000 of 2,000,000 people charged with serious crimes will require free legal
representation).
16. See cases cited in notes 35, 36 infra.
17. The Court in Miranda tried to make it very clear that financial ability is in no
way related to the scope of rights involved. Speaking of the indigent's right to
counsel, Chief Justice Warren stated:
Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with
counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with
a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a
right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey
to the indigent-the person most subjected to interrogation-the knowledge
that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with warnings of the
right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective
and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance
that he was truly in a position to exercise it.
384 U.S. 436, 473.
18. 432 Pa. 423, 248 A.2d 231 (1968).
Washington University Open Scholarship
122 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
warning was an absolute requirement, but did find that the "loophole"
available to police "is a narrow one which can only be utilized in the
clearest of cases."' The court, however, did not indicate what knowl-
edge of the defendant's financial circumstances must exist before it
would excuse the omission of the warning. In a later Pennsylvania
case, police knowledge that the defendant was a school teacher was not
sufficient to permit the omission of the appointed counsel warning.2 0
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in State v. Gendreau,2' on the
belief that Miranda is not a narrow decision, refused to give the terms
"indigent" and "ample funds" narrow definitions. The court held
that footnote forty-three condoned omission of the appointed counsel
warning only if the defendant was able to afford an attorney for the
post-arrest interrogation and all subsequent proceedings arising out of
the arrest. Any narrower approach, it argued, would fragment the
right to counsel and require a separate assessment of an accused's finan-
cial status at each successive stage of a criminal prosecution. In Gen-
dreau, police knowledge that the defendant was a carpenter did not
relieve the state of the duty to give the appointed counsel warning.
The burden was on the state to show the defendant had the financial
capability to retain private counsel. It failed to meet that burden;
therefore, the defendant's statement was not admitted.
These cases seem to indicate that the police must have more than
a cursory knowledge of the defendant's financial capacity. If the courts
employ a police knowledge test, then the goal of Miranda, the accurate
explanation to the defendant of his rights upon arrest, would be fur-
thered. Society as a whole would be benefited since police would be
alerted that failure to conform to Miranda by omitting the appointed
counsel warning would result in the loss of cases the state should have
won.
II. Ex Post Facto INQUIRY
One alternative to the police knowledge test is the resort to ex post
facto inquiries into the defendant's financial status. The Supreme
Court, in footnote forty-three, expresses an aversion to this approach.
This admonishment by the Court lends support to a police knowledge
test. Under that test a court must answer the threshold question of
19. Id. at 427, 248 A.2d at 233.
20. Commonwealth v. Yount, 435 Pa. 276, 256 A.2d 464 (1969). Yount and its
predecessor Dixon are discussed in greater detail in note 13 supra.
21. - R.I. -, 259 A.2d 855 (1969) discussed also in note 13 supra.
[Vol. 1972:117
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knowledge. If it finds inadequate knowledge, a motion to suppress
would be granted and the question of indigence avoided entirely. On
the other hand, the sole issue under the "ex post facto inquiry" test is
the defendant's financial status. Only if the defendant is indigent would
a motion to suppress be granted. Arguably, the protection offered by
Miranda would be diluted since the only issue is financial status. The
incentive to give the appointed counsel warning would be much less
than under the police knowlege test. Nevertheless, several courts have
adopted the ex post facto approach without the requirement of police
knowledge.
The ex post facto inquiry deals solely with the difficult problem of
indigence."- Appellate courts have refused to review indigence in the
absence of a clear objection.2 3  They have ruled the warning unnec-
essary because the defendant was in fact represented by employed
counsel24 or the record showed the defendant had adequate funds.2
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Chap-
22. The difficulty in defining indigence lies in the interdependency of so many
individually complex factors. The term is entirely relative. With these thoughts in
mind the court in State v. Harris, 5 Conn. Cir. 313, 250 A.2d 719 (1968), wondered
whether Justice Black's definition, "too poor to hire a lawyer," Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), alone would be sufficient.
23. United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1026
(1968); United States v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
953 (1968); State v. Devoe, 430 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. 1968); People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d
157, 242 N.E.2d 830, 295 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1968); Floyd v. State, 430 S.W.2d 888
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1968). In State v. Devoe, supra, Presiding Judge Finch, in a con-
curring opinion, rejected this rationale and instead based his decision on the defend-
ant's financial status. The defendant nowhere in the proceeding requested appointed
counsel or claimed he was indigent. In fact, he was defended by employed counsel.
In Floyd v. State, supra, the court reasoned that there were no objections to the de-
fendant's statements since they supported a self-defense plea. Also, the defendant was
represented by retained counsel.
24. United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1026
(1968); O'Neal v. State, 115 Ga. App. 100, 153 S.E.2d 663 (1967); People v. Baker,
19 Mich. App. 480, 172 N.W.2d 892 (1969) (represented on appeal by appointed
counsel; remanded for a hearing on indigence); State v. Devoe, 430 S.W.2d 164 (Mo.
1968) (concurring opinion); State v. Crump, 277 N.C. 573, 178 S.E.2d 366 (1971);
State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967);
Floyd v. State, 430 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968); Dickey v. State, 444 P.2d 373
(Wyo. 1968). Contra, United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442 (D. Del. 1966).
After the defendant signed a statement he was informed of his right to appointed
counsel which he promptly exercised. No mention was made of financial status.
25. United States v. Lubitsch, 266 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); State v. Bliss,
- Del. -, 238 A.2d 848 (1968); People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157, 242 N.E.2d 830,
295 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1968).
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lin,26 found it necessary to make an ex post facto inquiry into indigence
since the financial status of the defendant was doubtful. The defend-
ant stated that he lived alone and earned between sixty and one hun-
dred dollars per week. He had $1800 in cash in his possession, $800
of which he used to post bond. His girl friend owned a 1963 Cadillac
and shortly after the defendant's arrest purchased a 1967 Cadillac with
funds partially furnished by the defendant. The defendant had enough
credit that a fur dealer entrusted three mink coats to him on an ap-
proval basis. This evidence was held sufficient to support a finding
that the defendant had funds to retain counsel. The finding that
Chaplin had sufficient funds to retain counsel made the omission of the
appointed counsel warning non-prejudicial, and Chaplin's statement was
not suppressedY
Many courts employing ex post facto consideration of financial status
have overlooked the "temporal" problem. In determining whether the
defendant is indigent, a court must first decide the proper period of
time to focus upon the defendant's financial status. There are essen-
tially two choices. A court may look to the defendant's ability to re-
tain counsel at the time of trial or at the time of arrest and interroga-
tion. Courts looking to the time of trial often find that the defendant
is represented by retained counsel and hold that conclusive on the issue
of the defendant's non-indigence.2 8  This approach overlooks the situ-
ation existing at the time most crucial to the defendant, the period of
arrest and interrogation. This period is crucial because it is at this
time that the defendant must decide whether he will exercise his con-
stitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. Should the defendant
later acquire funds to pay an attorney, or relatives come to his aid,
the state would be relieved of its burden to provide appointed counsel.
It would seem -unwise, however, for the police to anticipate such an
uncertain event by omitting the warning. The fear is that the accused
individual, at the time of interrogation, unaware of his right to free
counsel and reluctant to incur attorney's fees, goes through the ques-
tioning alone.29 Resort to the ex post facto finding means the holding
26. 435 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 322-23. The court refused to set any dollar guidelines. Its primary
reason was the inflationary tendency in the economy. This unwillingness to set a
fixed standard supports the proposition that the question of indigence is so difficult that
courts refuse to define it too precisely.
28. See cases cited in note 24 supra. See also the discussion of Commonwealth v.
Dixon, 432 Pa. 423, 248 A.2d 231 (1968) in note 13 supra.
29. Commonwealth v. Dixon, 432 Pa. 423, 425, 248 A.2d 231, 233 (1968).
[Vol. 1972:117
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss1/8
Vol. 1972:117] RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
of an extra hearing, which would add to the already existing delay
burdening our criminal courts. 0
Ill. WHAT IS INDIGENCE?
In order to apply a test based on an ex post facto finding of financial
status, regardless of whether police knowledge is additionally required,
the courts must ultimately decide how they will define "indigence."
Because of the diverse, complex factors involved in determining in-
digence, the courts have been unable to set down workable guidelines.
Generally indigence means poor or needy or destitute of property.3
Only a small amount of earnings may remove a litigant from the in-
digent "classification. '3 2  In providing appointed counsel for indigent
criminal defendants, a court must make more than a cursory inquiry
into financial status.33  The determination is far from simple. A mul-
titude of factors must be examined:
A starting point is income. Other factors include bank accounts or
convertible assets, ownership of home or ownership of automobile, em-
30. See State v. Bliss, - Del. -, 238 A.2d 848 (1968). The footnote at 850
reads as follows:
The police are advised to give this warning rather than rely upon a future
finding of lack of prejudice. It is easily given and, if given, forestalls delays
in disposition of cases in instances like the present one. We think this is the
meaning of footnote 43....
31. See, e.g., Weeks v. Mansfield, 84 Conn. 544, 80 A. 784, 786 (1911);
City of Lynchburg v. Slaughter, 75 Va. 57, 62 (1880); Juneau County v. Wood
County, 109 Wis. 330, 333, 85 N.W. 387, 388 (1901). For a comment on the diffi-
culty legal aid societies have assessing the financial status of prospective clients see
A. BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, THE AMmUCAN LAWYER 74 (1954).
32. In Alexander v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 2d 538, 84 P.2d 1061 (1938),
the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to order that the prepayment of jury fees be
waived. At the time of the hearing the petitioner was earning $110-115 per month
on the average. The court held that the petitioner was not indigent. A similar re-
sult was reached in Brown v. Upfold, 204 Misc. 416, 123 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct.
1953). A personal injury victim, who had a wife and four minor children was paying
$31 per month for his residence, and was receiving only $161 per month in welfare was
not allowed a trial calendar preference on account of indigence. In examining cases
involving the question of indigence, the reader must be especially careful. The re-
sults of inflation may be marked. What may have been considered a substantial sum
at some time in the past may be insignificant today.
33. Wood v. United States, 389 U.S. 20, 21 (1967); Bowen v. State, 236 So. 2d 16,
18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Anaya, 76 N.M. 572, 576, 417 P.2d 58, 60
(1966); State ex rel. Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis. 2d 82, 86, 128 N.W.2d 422, 424-25
(1964). If the defendant's financial status changes during the course of a proceeding,
further inquiry is not foreclosed. Elliot v. District Court, 157 Colo. 229, 402 P.2d 65
(1965); State v. Anaya, 76 N.M. 572, 577, 417 P.2d 58, 61 (1966).
Washington University Open Scholarship
126 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1972:117
ployment status, outstanding debts, number of dependents, and [the
cost of counsel].3 4
Physical appearance may be deceiving. Property in the name of the
accused individual may be heavily encumbered. Also, due to a civil
action pending against the defendant, he may not be able to offer his
assets as security. 35  A court cannot refuse to appoint counsel because
the defendant is an able-bodied man and ought to be able to employ
a lawyer, but instead must examine actual financial ability. 6 Each
decision is unique, with the ultimate question being: can this defend-
ant afford to employ an attorney? The general notion of what consti-
tutes indigence appears no different in the footnote forty-three situa-
tion. The questions are time-consuming, difficult to answer, and arise
at all stages of the judicial process.
IV. REQUIRE THE WARNING IN ALL CASES
Although not suggested by the Court in Miranda, another solution
to the footnote forty-three problem would be to make the warning a
strict requirement and thereby avoid the question of financial status
34. State v. Harris, 5 Conn. Cir. 313, 315, 250 A.2d 719, 721 (1968). The
bracketed portion should read "the seriousness of the charge," which is misleading.
Therefore, the bracketed portion has been substituted as a clarification to the reader.
See also Note, Representation of Indigents in California-A Field Study of the Public
Defender System and Assigned Counsel Systems, 13 STAN. L. REv. 522, 545 (1961).
35. The defendant was found to be indigent in the following cases: In Rast v.
State, 77 Fla. 225, 81 So. 523 (1919), the defendant in an embezzlement prosecution
owned real estate including a homestead worth $15,000-18,000 but because a civil
action for embezzlement of $100,000 in tax money was pending against him, no one
was willing to loan the defendant anything. In People v. Chism, 17 Mich. App. 196,
169 N.W.2d 192 (1969), the accused and his wife owned as tenants by entirety real
estate worth $14,000 with an outstanding indebtedness of $2000. They also jointly
owned two cars worth $3200 and 30 shares of stock worth $3100. Title to a motor-
cycle was in the accused's name but was a gift to his minor son. His wife had a
$1500 bank balance. She filed for divorce prior to the criminal prosecution but little
had transpired in that action. Between the first and second hearing on indigence the
defendant conveyed his interests in the above property to his wife who refused to
contribute to his defense since they had separated and she needed the money to support
her minor son. The defendant tried to retain an attorney but was told that he needed a
$5000 retainer fee. See also Keur v. State, 160 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
The sale of assets seems appropriate in the above situations. In certain circum-
stances, though, this may be impossible. For example, the property may have been
attached or so encumbered that a sale would realize little if anything. The cases dis-
cussed in this footnote do not discuss this point.
36. Schmidt v. Uhlenhopp, 258 Iowa 771, 775, 140 N.W.2d 118, 121 (1966);
State v. Anaya, 76 N.M. 572, 576, 417 P.2d 58, 61 (1966); State v. Cowart, 251 S.C.
360, 365, 162 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1968).
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and the necessity of ex post facto inquiries entirely. The language
of footnote forty-three dispels the notion that requiring all the warnings
is the rule courts should follow. Yet the rule does present a plausible
guideline for police behavior. Several reasons have been offered to
support this limitation on law enforcement authorities. As discussed
above, indigence is difficult to define. With the added knowledge that
many criminal defendants are indigent, 37 the police are alerted that
giving all warnings is probably necessary. In a sense, the suggestion
is that the police should be made to do what they are inclined to do.
Arguably, society would benefit if the police followed procedures which
do not cause the loss of cases because of their oversight. The
Supreme Court suggests in footnote forty-three that the warning is
easily given,3 that is, the burden on police is minimal.3 9 The conclu-
sion has been drawn that the only adverse effects of Miranda on convic-
tion and confession rates were transitional, and after law enforcement
authorities had had time to adjust to the new procedures, confession
and conviction rates returned to their former levels. 40  Those who
would oppose requiring all Miranda warnings in all cases feel that the
police will be hampered in their duty to enforce the criminal statutes.
37. See articles cited in note 15 supra.
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966). The Court refers to the
warning as a "simple expedient."
39. The court in United States v. Lubitsch, 266 F. Supp. 294, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
thinks that the better practice is to give the warning as does the Second Circuit in
United States v. Chaplin, 435 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1970). See also State v. Bliss,
discussed in note 30 supra.
40. Studies were undertaken in several urban areas shortly after Miranda in order
to determine its effects on law enforcement. The general conclusions are that Miranda
did not impair the opportunity for effective interrogation and had little impact on the
conviction or confession rate. See Medalie, Zeitz and Alexander, Custodial Interroga-
tion in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. REv.
1347 (1968); Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, U. PrTT.
L. REv. 1 (1967); Younger, 35 FORDHAM L. REv. 255 (1966); Note, Interrogations
in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J 1519 (1967); Note, A Postscript
to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967);
See also Robinson, Police and Prosecutor Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interroga-
tion as Revealed by Pre- and Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police
Capacity to Comply, 1968 DuKE L.J. 425.
In his article, Younger was surveying the effects of People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d
338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965), which
liberally construed Escobedo. Younger found Dorado did not present a difficult
problem in the prosecution of cases. Because its requirements were similar to
Miranda, the adjustment which had to be made for prosecutions was small. Some
pre-Miranda confessions were found inadmissible at post-Miranda trials but the result
was regarded as merely transitional. 35 FoRDHAM L. REv. at 259.
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If the conclusions in the surveys noted above are reliable, then this
argument loses much of its force.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Harris v. New
York,41 proponents of the absolute requirement for Miranda warnings
would consider this safeguard all the more necessary. The Court in
Harris held that voluntary but otherwise unconstitutionally obtained
statements may be used for impeachment purposes at trial. Ex post
facto inquiries into financial status, including those requiring police
knowledge, provide potential loopholes for police if they omit the ap-
pointed counsel warning. With Harris, police receive some encourage-
ment to ignore the safeguards set down in Miranda since the statement
still may be -used for a limited purpose. The rationale of the Miranda
decision is to insure that if an accused individual waives his constitu-
tional rights he does so with knowledge of those rights. If one accepts
the Court's premise that the rights involved are precious to the indi-
vidual, then any devise which allows these rights to be circumvented
should be discouraged. The strict requirement that all Miranda warn-
ings be given would omit all police discretion and in that way help to
achieve the goals set forth in Miranda.
The problems in the cases discussed in this note result primarily from
the non-retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda .4 2 A confes-
sion obtained prior to Miranda could meet all constitutional require-
ments then in effect, but because the trial began after Miranda, the
statements would be rendered inadmissible in most cases. 43 The warn-
ing of the right to appointed counsel was an innovation of Miranda;
therefore, the likelihood that this warning would be omitted in a pre-
Miranda interrogation is high. The only indication that there will be
no ex post facto determination in a post-Miranda interrogation case
appears in Chaplin. The court was faced with a pre-Miranda interro-
gation and made an ex post facto determination, but stated:
[I]f Chaplain's statement had been taken after Miranda had been de-
41. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See also Note, Impeachment by Unconstitutionally Ob-
tained Evidence: The Rule of Harris v. New York, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 441.
42. In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court held that Escobedo
applies only to cases in which the trial commenced after June 22, 1964 and Miranda
to trials commencing after June 13, 1966.
43. Post-Miranda cases used in this note are State v. Crump, 277 N.C. 573,
178 S.E.2d 366 (1971) and Floyd v. State, 430 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
The courts in these cases do not even consider the significance that all proceedings
were subsequent to Miranda.
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cided, we would hold the Government to its duty to have warned Chaplin
of his possible right to assigned counsel for, to say the least about
Chaplin's financial ability at the time he made his statement to the
prosecutor, there could well have been doubts about whether Chaplin
was indigent.44
Several aspects of the statement merit emphasis. First, the court ad-
monished resort to ex post facto inquiries in post-Miranda interroga-
tions. Secondly, it regarded the time of interrogation as crucial in
making any determination of indigence. Lastly, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit expressed a more stringent approach to post-
Miranda interrogations. Since Miranda was decided over five years
ago, the transitional period surrounding it should be over. Very few
cases involving pre-Miranda interrogations are pending. This may
mean that the appointed counsel warning problem is a diminishing one,
as police departments have standardized their procedures and have re-
sorted more and more to "the card". However, the practical problem
still exists. So long as it does, the argument that all warnings should
be given in all cases merits serious consideration.45
44. 435 F.2d 320 at 322. The language in Chaplin is not so broad as to require
all warnings in all cases. A similar result was reached in Griffith v. Jones, 283 F.
Supp. 794 (N.D. Ga. 1967), a habeas corpus proceeding. The defendant was con-
victed of burglary on the basis of a pre-Miranda confession. Because there was no
specific objection on indigence at trial, the state supreme court held that the issue
would not be proper on appeal, Griffith v. State, 223 Ga. 543, 156 S.E.2d 903 (1967).
The federal court, in the habeas corpus proceeding, held that the burden was on the
state to show the defendant's indigence, which it failed to do. It did not remand for
a hearing on indigence but granted the writ. It found the language of footnote
forty-three and the text to which it is appended forecloses the necessity for an ex post
facto finding, 283 F. Supp. 794 at 796. The court does, however, suggest that there
may be circumstances in which the appointed counsel warning is unnecessary but
fails to give any examples.
The Griffith court regarded Fendley v. United States, 384 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967)
as almost directly on point. The warning in Fendley, however, was inadequate because
the defendant was not informed that he was entitled to have appointed counsel present
at the post-arrest interrogation, the omission of two parts of the required warnings.
45. Several studies indicate that Miranda may not have gone far enough in its
effort to protect the accused individual. Demeanor of the police at the interrogation
as well as their tone of voice can do much to dissuade an individual from remaining
silent, and in spite of the warnings, individuals of all income and educational back-
grounds felt some obligation to talk. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police
Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH.
L. REv. 1347 (1968); Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda,
76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967); Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of
Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967).
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V. HARMLESS ERROR
Several jurisdictions find the failure to warn the non-indigent de-
fendant of the right to appointed counsel to be harmless error.4 0 In
Chapman v. California,4r the Supreme Court held that if the appellate
court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any constitutionally
tainted evidence admitted at trial is non-prejudicial, then its admission
constitutes harmless constitutional error.48 However, the Court has
not stated whether it would apply the harmless error rule to Escobedo
and Miranda.49 Some state courts infer from Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to Chapman that Escobedo and Miranda are within its
scope. To illustrate, the post-indictment line-up cases, United States v.
Wade50 and Gilbert v. California,5 which relied on Escobedo and Mir-
anda for support, were remanded to see whether the introduction of
identification evidence would be harmless error. 2 The Supreme Court
of Nevada has held that the harmless constitutional error rule applied
in situations where new procedural safeguards were denied retroactive
application. 53  In Stovall v. Denno,54 which denied retroactive appli-
cation to Wade and Gilbert, the Court looked to the impact on the
fact-finding process necessary to require retroactive application. It ob-
served that line-ups could be fair without resorting to these safe-
46. United States v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
953 (1968); State v. Bliss, - Del. -, 238 A.2d 848 (1968); O'Neal v. State, 115 Ga.
App. 100, 153 S.E.2d 663 (1967); Commonwealth v. Wilbur, 353 Mass. 376, 231 N.E.
2d 919 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1010 (1968); Guyette v. State, 84 Nev. 160,
438 P.2d 244 (1968); People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d 157, 242 N.E.2d 830, 295 N.Y.S.2d
665 (1968); State v. Crump, 277 N.C. 573, 178 S.E.2d 366 (1971); Hayes v. State,
39 Wis. 2d 125, 158 N.W.2d 545 (1968).
47. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
48. Id. at 24.
49. The Court in Chapman refused to hold that all federal constitutional errors
regardless of the facts and circumstances are harmful. The Court found some rights to
be so basic to a fair trial that their infraction would never constitute harmless error;
reversal is automatic in these situations. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced
confession); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge). For a more com-
prehensive list of automatic reversal cases, see Guyette v. State, 84 Nev. 160, 438 P.2d
244, 248 n.1 (1968).
50. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
51. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
52. See Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968), commented
in 72 DIcK. L. R~v. 536 (1968).
53. Guyette v. State, 84 Nev. 160, 438 P.2d 244 (1968).
54. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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guards.' Escobedo and Miranda, which are also prospectively ap-
plied, are subject to similar considerations."
When the appointed counsel warning is omitted, harmless error takes
three forms. The error may be harmless because there is no duty to
warn a non-indigent of a right he does not possess. 7 The second
variety of harmless error is the admission of a statement which is not
harmful to the defendant's case. The third is the admission of an in-
criminating statement on grounds of overwhelming independent evi-
dence. The courts which have resorted to the first definition of harm-
less error were faced with pre-Miranda interrogations. The courts
consciously attempted to mitigate Miranda's harsh consequences upon
the state. With a pre-Miranda interrogation, if there was complete
compliance with Escobedo, the law then in effect, and if coercion was
absent, the courts have not been reluctant to find that any ensuing
statement followed a knowing and intelligent waiver. Harmless error,
however, is a misnomer in these cases. The courts employing this
approach, instead, seem to be saying that no error was committed, for
how can there be any error if there is no duty to warn the defendant
of his rights? Stated simply, harmless error results from the trial
judge's improper admission of a statement not deemed prejudicial to
the defendant. If the warning of the right to appointed counsel was
55. Id. at 299.
56. In many instances police interrogation is absent the coercive elements sug-
gested in Miranda.
57. United States v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
953 (1968); State v. Bliss, - Del. -, 238 A.2d 848 (1968); O'Neal v. State,
115 Ga. App. 100, 153 S.E.2d 663 (1967); Commonwealth v. Wilbur, 353 Mass. 376,
231 N.E.2d 919 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1010 (1968); People v. Post, 23 N.Y.2d
157, 242 N.E.2d 830, 295 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1968). Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966). The defendant objected to administration of a blood test. Speaking
for the Court, Justice Brennan made the following remarks regarding the right to
counsel:
This conclusion [that a blood test is not an incriminating product of com-
pulsion] also answers the petitioner's claim that, in compelling him to submit
to the test in face of the fact that his objection was made on advice of
counsel, he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel. Since petitioner was not entitled to assert the privilege, he has no
greater right because counsel erroneously advised him that he could assert it.
His claim is strictly limited to the failure of the police to respect his wish,
reinforced by counsel's advice, to be left inviolate. No issue of counsel's abil-
ity to assist petitioner in respect of any rights he did possess is presented.
The limited claim thus made must be rejected.
384 U.S. 757, 765-6.
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not required, and Miranda was otherwise complied with, the admission
of the confession would not be improper.
In the second variety of harmless error the defendant has made a
potentially harmful statement to the police. It may be exculpatory or
supportive of a defense argued by the defendant. 58 In these situations
the failure to suppress a statement could be non-prejudicial, the possi-
bilities for harm being minimal. Under the third variety of harmless
error, the defendant has made an incriminating statement to the police,
but there is overwhelming independent evidence to support a guilty
verdict. No footnote forty-three case covers this exact situation but
a few suggest the overwhelming independent evidence approach."0 The
nature of the statement may be the decisive factor. If the defendant
makes a statement that he was in the vicinity of the scene of the
crime, it will probably be less persuasive to a jury than the often fatal
outright confession. If the statistical data on the necessity of confes-
sions for convictions, allegedly a small number, is accurate, then ad-
mission of statements made by an insufficiently warned defendant may
be harmless constitutional error. 0 This approach is similar to the
California rule that if "confessions" are admitted as evidence, the case
is subject to automatic reversal, but if the statements are simply "ad-
missions", they are subject to the harmless error rule."' This inter-
58. State v. Cramp, 277 N.C. 573, 178 S.E.2d 366 (1971). The defendant testi-
fied at trial to what he previously told police. This supported a plea of self-defense.
Cf. People v. Alesi, 67 Cal. 2d 856, 434 P.2d 360, 64 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1967) (de-
cided under Escobedo). In Hayes v. State, 39 Wis. 2d 125, 158 N.W.2d 545 (1968),
exculpatory statutes were found to be admissible. Although they involved some
inconsistencies, there was overwhelming independent evidence to support the verdict.
In light of the recent holding in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), such a
voluntary but otherwise unconstitutionally obtained statement could be used for im-
peachment purposes. The defendant in Hayes, however, did not testify in his own
behalf.
59. Hayes v. State, 39 Wis. 2d 125, 158 N.W.2d 545 (1968) comes closest to this
factual situation. The defendant was tried for murder. An exculpatory but incon-
sistent statement was erroneously admitted, but the court found the error harmless.
The state called fourteen witnesses, six of whom saw the defendant running from
the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. There was also physical evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt. To a lesser extent Guyette v. State, 84 Nev. 160,
438 P.2d 244 (1968) supports this proposition. Incriminating statements were ad-
mitted in spite of the absence of the appointed counsel warning. The statement was
voluntary, complied with Escobedo which was then in effect, and the most damag-
ing evidence was not given in response to any interrogation.
60. See note 40 supra.
61. A "confession" in these terms is a statement by someone accused of a crime to
the effect that he is guilty unless it is broad enough to include all essential elements
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pretation of the harmless error rule seems more in line with Chapman.
Courts recognize a duty to warn the defendant of his rights, but will
excuse a failure to give proper warnings only if the evidence intro-
duced is non-prejudicial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The subject of primary concern in this note is how to handle police
omission of the appointed counsel warning. Several approaches have
been suggested. The first, the police knowledge test, is derived from
the language of footnote forty-three. The Court speaks of what is
known about the defendant's financial condition. Ex post facto in-
quiries into financial status are also proposed in the footnote, but in
a negative way, through the Court's admonishment of such an ap-
proach. The requirement that the police give all Miranda warnings in
all cases clearly is not a product of the footnote. The Supreme Court
suggests that a person known to have ample funds need not be given
the appointed counsel warning. Nevertheless, this approach represents
a plausible guideline for police conduct. The problems inherent in
each of these tests may be best appreciated through the analysis of four
hypothetical situations. For the purposes of analysis, it is assumed that
in each case the defendant has been given all Miranda warnings except
the appointed counsel warning, and that he has made an inculpatory
statement:
1. There is reasonable basis to believe the defendant is indigent, and
he is in fact indigent.
2. There is reasonable basis to believe the defendant is indigent, but
he is in fact not indigent.
3. There is reasonable basis to believe the defendant is not indigent,
but he is in fact indigent.
4. There is reasonable basis to believe the defendant is not indigent,
and he is in fact not indigent.
The first hypothetical presents no difficulty at all. Under all tests the
defendant's statement will be suppressed. There is no justification for
necessary to make out a case against him. An "admission" is the acknowledgment of a
fact or circumstance in itself insufficient to prove guilt but it tends to the ultimate
proof of guilt. Needless to say, the problems in distinguishing between the two appear
complicated. See, e.g., People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 401 P.2d 382, 44 Cal. Rptr.
30 (1965); In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1967). Ohio seems
to have an automatic reversal rule for all statements, State v. Gresham, 10 Ohio App.
2d 199, 227 N.E.2d 248 (1967).
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failing to give the appointed counsel warning in this situation.
The second hypothetical shows the major conflict between the police
knowledge test and the ex post facto inquiry. Under the former ap-
proach, the statement will be suppressed, but not under the latter. The
police knowledge test's additional requirement that the police have "ad-
equate" knowledge of the defendant's financial status dictates that the
warning be given in this situation even though the defendant is in fact
not entitled to the warning. The weakness inherent in the test is the
general inability to determine an individual's financial status from his
physical appearance, but the additional requirement of knowledge pro-
vides the defendant greater protection. The ex post facto inquiry pro-
duces the correct result in terms of financial status, but in this case
neglects the appearance of the reality which existed at the time of in-
terrogation. At that time, for all intents and purposes, the defendant
was indigent. In this context, the defendant is not offered the protec-
tion available under the police knowledge test. The third hypothetical
is the converse of the second. In this factual setting, the statements
will be suppressed under all tests. No court has prevented an indigent
defendant from being fully informed of his rights upon arrest. The
second and third hypotheticals show the basic differences between the
police knowledge test and resort to ex post facto inquiries. With the
former approach, the defendant is given the appointed counsel warning
if he is non-indigent or police do not know his financial status. This
goes far in protecting the defendant. With the latter approach, how-
ever, only financial status means anything. Police are given wider dis-
cretion in the decision whether to give the appointed counsel warning.
The police knowledge test and to a lesser extent the ex post facto in-
quiry set guidlines for police behavior, but the discretionary element
is still present. In this respect the tests present indicia by which the
courts may evaluate whether suppression of the defendant's statement
is warranted or not, affecting police behavior to a lesser extent. The
clear standard that all warnings be given in all cases is aimed directly
at police behavior, the source of the problem. In both the second and
the third hypotheticals the defendant's statement would be suppressed.
All discretion is eliminated. A court reviewing police behavior would
only have to decide whether or not the warnings were properly given. 2
62. The courts still are faced with the question whether the interrogation was
custodial or not and whether the defendant in fact waived his rights but the nagging
problem of financial status has been eliminated.
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The absolute requirement that all warnings be given raises the com-
plaint that law enforcement authorities are thereby shackled with cum-
bersome procedures which favor the "criminal" and result in harm to
the general public. The fourth hypothetical points up that problem.
The statement would not be suppressed under either the police knowl-
edge or ex post facto inquiry tests, but on the other hand, if all warn-
ings are required, the statement would not be admitted as evidence.
In this situation the defendant clearly is not entitled to the appointed
counsel warning. Society would be harmed by allowing a "guilty" per-
son to go free on account of a technicality totally unrelated to the par-
ticular defendant. However, one must question how often this situa-
tion is likely to occur. This danger to society must be balanced against
the rights of the individual. Knowledge that many criminal defend-
ants are indigent should put police on guard that warnings are neces-
sary in almost every case. The likelihood is that the police will be un-
able to determine the defendant's financial status. The prevalence of
the doubtful case should then set some guideline for police. Since one
may never be sure, it is best to take all possible precautions. The gen-
eral public should then derive benefit due to the adherence to proce-
dures which do not allow the state to lose cases because of omissions
by law enforcement officials. It has been observed that Miranda only
temporarily restricted police behavior and once police departments had
time to adjust, their confession and conviction rates returned to their
former levels.0 3 The strict requirement that all warnings be given may
not then be the great danger it is purported to be.
63. See note 40 supra.
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